This paper investigates a combinatorial optimization problem motived from a secure power network design application in [Dán and Sandberg 2010] . Two equivalent graph optimization formulations are derived. One of the formulations is a relaxed version of the connected dominating set problem, motivating the term relaxed connected dominating set (RCDS) problem. The RCDS problem is shown to be NP-hard, even for planar graphs. A mixed integer linear programming formulation is presented. In addition, for planar graphs a fixed parameter polynomial time solution methodology based on spherecut decomposition and dynamic programming is presented. The computation cost of the sphere-cut decomposition based approach grows linearly with problem instance size, provided that the branchwidth of the underlying graph is fixed and small. A case study with IEEE benchmark power networks verifies that small branchwidth are not uncommon in practice. The case study also indicates that the proposed methods show promise in computation efficiency.
I. INTRODUCTION
Our society depends heavily on the proper operation of network systems including intelligent transport systems, electric power distribution and transmission systems etc. These systems are supervised and controlled through Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems. For instance, in the electric power transmission grid, SCADA systems collect measurements through remote terminal units (RTUs) and send them to the state estimator to estimate the system states. The estimated states are used for subsequent operations such as contingency analysis (for system health monitoring) and optimal power flow dispatch (for control). Any malfunctioning of these operations can lead to significant social and economical consequences such as the northeast US blackout of 2003.
Because of its importance, the SCADA measurement system has been the subject of extensive studies. Recently, an important measurement system related research topic which has attracted a lot of attention is cyber-physical security. One of the purposes of cyber-physical security studies is to analyze various types of data attacks and their consequences on the system (e.g., [2] - [8] ). Another important research direction, which is the focus of this paper, is security-guaranteeing system design. A typical design objective is to seek the minimum cost strategic placement of protection resources K.C. Sou is with the Department of Electrical Engineering, National Sun Yat-sen University, Taiwan. J. Lu is with the School of Information Science and Technology, ShanghaiTech University, China. E-mail: sou12@mail.nsysu.edu.tw, lujie@shanghaitech.edu.cn This work was supported by the Natural Science Foundation of Shanghai under grant 16ZR1422500 and the Shanghai Pujiang Program under grant 16PJ1406400.
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(e.g., encryption devices, secure phasor measurement units) so that, according to the chosen attack and defense model, no data attack in the system is possible (e.g., [3] , [5] , [8] ). The security-guaranteeing system design problem is also closely related to the problem of observability-guaranteeing system design in power systems (e.g., [9] , [10] ). Because of the combinatorial feature, it is often considered "acceptable" to obtain only suboptimal solutions of protection placement problems. For example, [3] , [5] , [8] consider various types of heuristic algorithms for protection placement, aiming to minimize the protection cost. Reference [7] provides a suboptimal (in economic sense) strategy for some given possible attack scenarios. Instead, this paper reports efficient and exact solution methodologies, with optimality guarantee, to a nontrivial system protection placement problem first described in [3] . The design problem, to be described in Section II, seeks a minimum cost strategy to encrypt the measurement communications in a power network, in order to prevent stealth data attack of the form in [2] . Reference [3] points out that the design problem is related to a dominating set problem, and proposes a heuristic suboptimal solution algorithm based on the observation. While the analysis in [3] is performed in a linear algebra setting involving matrix rank calculations, this paper investigates the problem from a graph perspective and provides two equivalent graph optimization formulations characterizing the problem. We prove that the design problem is NP-hard (even when restricted to planar graphs). In addition, we derive a mixed integer linear programming formulation of the problem that is easy to implement (with three sets of constraints) and reasonably efficient to solve (e.g., CPLEX solves an instance with 300 nodes in less than one second on a personal computer). To enable the design with very large-scale systems we develop a fixed parameter polynomial time design algorithm, which is a two-step procedure based on sphere-cut decomposition [11] and dynamic programming. This approach provides an exact solution to the design problem when the underlying graph is planar, and provides a (reasonably tight) upper bound in general. The main advantage of the proposed approach is computation efficiency in both theory and practice. The computation cost grows linearly with problem instance size (i.e., number of edges), provided that a graph structure parameter called branchwidth [11] is fixed and small. In practice, it is not uncommon (as indicated by the IEEE power network benchmarks) that the branchwidth of an application graph is small, because intuitively branchwidth is a measure of how closely a graph resembles a tree (branchwidth ≤ 2 for trees). The sphere-cut decomposition (resp., branch decomposition and tree decomposition) approach has been applied with success to provide fixed parameter polynomial time algorithms for difficult combinatorial problems (e.g., [12] , [13] ). In fact, [14] , a precursor to this paper, applies the branch decomposition technique to solve the standard dominating set problem related to the design problem in this paper. The main difference between the current paper and [14] is that the exact model for the design problem is considered here. In addition, the complexity analysis, the integer programming formulation and the tailored spherecut decomposition based optimization algorithm are reported for the first time. The current paper is also similar to two previous work in algorithmic computer science/combinatorial optimization, namely [15] , [16] . In particular, reference [15] , which is more related to this paper, describes a spherecut decomposition/dynamic programming algorithm for the connected dominating set problem. Part of the distinction of this paper is that we consider a relaxed (and more general) version of the connected dominating set problem. As a result, the dynamic programming algorithm needs to be generalized. Moreover, reference [15] focuses purely on the theoretical optimization problem, while we formulate the relaxed connected dominating set problem from application. Outline: In Section II the secure system design problem is described. In Section III two equivalent graph optimization formulations modeling the secure system design problem are presented. The complexity of the problem is discussed, and a mixed integer linear programming formulation is presented. Section IV introduces the two-step fixed parameter polynomial time algorithm for the design problem when the underlying graph is planar. It reviews the first stepsphere-cut decomposition. Section V explains the second step -dynamic programming to solve the design problem. The parameterized complexity is briefly discussed in the end of the section. Section VI presents a numerical case study on IEEE power network benchmarks. It demonstrates the practical usefulness of the presented solution approaches.
II. APPLICATION MOTIVATIONS
A power network can be modeled as an undirected connected graph where the nodes are buses, and the edges are transmission lines. Following [3] , this paper adopts the DC power flow model [17] as the measurement model for state estimation. In this model, the power system states are the voltage phasors at the buses and the vector of states is denoted by θ . In this paper, the "full measurement" assumption is made. That is, as in the setup of [3] , each bus is equipped with a remote terminal unit (RTU) to obtain the following measurements: (net) active power injection at the bus and active power flows on the transmission lines incident to the bus. Let z denote the vector of measurements. Then, the states and measurements are related by z = Hθ + ∆z, where H is the measurement matrix describing how the active power injection and active power flow measurements are linearly related to the voltage phasors (i.e., the states). ∆z models the imperfection of the measurements. In this paper, ∆z is assumed to be the vector of data attacks in the measurements.
In power system operations, a "bad data detection" (BDD) scheme attempts to detect possible data attack in the measurements (i.e., ∆z). In a typical residual-based BDD scheme, the measurement residual r and the data attack ∆z are related by r = (I − H(H T R −1 H) −1 H T R −1 )∆z := S∆z, where R is a given diagonal positive definite matrix and S is typically referred to as the residual sensitivity matrix. In the BDD scheme, if the residual r is large (in magnitude, for example) the data attack ∆z is also large. In this case, the operator is notified of possible anomalies in the power system. However, it can be verified that SH = 0. This fact was exploited in [2] to introduce a detection-evading data attack of the form ∆z = Hθ , whereθ can be interpreted as a vector of "fictitious" voltage phasors, because the residual resulted by ∆z = Hθ is zero. In view of the interpretation of the measurement matrix H and the full measurement assumption, a data attack ∆z can evade BDD detection if the following "attack rules" are satisfied: (A1) every bus can be associated with some fictitious voltage phasor (collectively forming the vectorθ in above) such that the component of ∆z affecting active power flow measurement on a transmission line is proportional to the difference of the fictitious voltage phasors at the incident buses. (A2) at each bus the component of ∆z affecting active power injection measurement satisfies Kirchhoff's current law with the components of ∆z affecting the active power flow measurements on incident transmission lines. To counter these attacks, [3] considers the scenario in which buses can be protected by installing authentication devices in the corresponding RTUs. The protection rules are as follows: (P1) if a bus is protected, then none of the measurements related to the bus can be attacked. In other words, the components of data attack ∆z corresponding to the measurements related to the bus must be zero. The related measurements include the active power injection at the bus and the active power flows on all incident transmission lines. (P2) if a bus is not protected, then the active power injection measurement at the bus can be attacked. (P3) if a transmission line is not incident to any protected bus, then the active power flow measurement on it can be attacked. Note that without the "full measurement" assumption, protection rules different from (P1)-(P3) need to be considered. The discussion of the ramifications is, however, beyond the scope of this paper. A subset of buses is called a perfect protection set if when the buses in the set are protected, according to the protection rules (P1) through (P3), there cannot be any detection-avoiding data attack with fictitious voltage phasors satisfying attack rules (A1) and (A2). In [3] , the perfect protection problem seeks a minimum cardinality perfect protection set. Assuming that the cost associated with the protection is nondecreasing with the number of protected buses, a minimum perfect protection set provides the most economical protection placement strategy.
III. PROBLEM FORMULATIONS AND COMPLEXITY
Let (V, E) be a simple undirected graph modeling a power network, with V being the node set and E ⊆ {{u, v} | u ∈ V, v ∈ V } being the edge set. In this paper, we use the unordered pair {u, v} to denote an (undirected) edge. For any graph G, we use the symbols V (G) and E(G) to denote the sets of nodes and edges, respectively.
A set D ⊆ V is called a (graph) perfect protection set if the bus set corresponding to D is a perfect protection set for the power network modeled by (V, E). Accordingly, the (graph) perfect protection problem seeks a minimum cardinality (graph) perfect protection set. For a given graph modeling a power network, it is possible to characterize the perfect protection sets directly in graph, without using the original definition of perfect protection sets involving attack rules (A1) and (A2) and protection rules (P1) through (P3). In the following, two equivalent definitions of perfect protection set are presented. The two definitions lead to two equivalent formulations of the perfect protection problem with different advantages.
A. Integer programming problem formulation
The first characterization of perfect protection set is as follows:
0} denote the subset of E incident to U. Then, a set D ⊆ V is a perfect protection set if and only if the subgraph (V, I D (E)) is connected. Due to page limitation, the proofs of the statements in this paper are omitted. They can be found in [1] .
Remark 1: The connected components of (V, I D (E)) in the statement of Proposition 1 correspond to observable islands in the terminology of power network state estimation observability analysis [17] .
A benefit of the perfect protection set characterization in Proposition 1 is that it enables the mixed integer linear programming formulation of the perfect protection problem. For each i ∈ V , we denote the neighborhood N i := { j | {i, j} ∈ E}. In addition, we designate (arbitrarily) a source node s ∈ V . Then, the perfect protection problem is formulated as:
(1) The decision variables are defined such that i ∈ V is in the perfect protection set D if and only if x i = 1. The decision variables y i j and y ji for each {i, j} ∈ E are auxiliary "network flow" variables along the edges in two possible directions, in order to model connectedness of the subgraph (V, I D (E)) in Proposition 1. The first constraint is flow conservation constraint at all nodes except the source s. This means that for every i ∈ V \ {s} one unit of flow is being shipped from s to i. The second constraint, together with the nonnegativity of the flows in the third constraint, specifies that an edge {i, j} can be used to ship flows if and only if at least one of its two ends is chosen in the perfect protection set D. As a result, the three constraints together model the requirement that (V, I D (E)) is connected.
B. Relaxed connected dominating set problem formulation
The second (equivalent) characterization of perfect protection set is as follows:
Proposition 2: Let graph (V, E) be given. A set D ⊆ V is a perfect protection set if and only if D satisfies both of the following conditions 1) D is a dominating set of (V, E), meaning that every node in V is either in D or a neighbor of a member of D; 2) For any i, j ∈ D, there exists a sequence i =
it holds that s = t − 2. Remark 2: A connected dominating set D c (e.g., [18] ) is a dominating set with an additional property that between any two nodes in D c there exists a path traversing nodes only in D c . Condition 2) in Proposition 2 is a relaxed notion of connectedness. For D satisfying condition 2), between any two nodes in D there exists a "relaxed path" such that between two consecutive members of D along the path there can be one node not in D. This motivates the term "relaxed connected dominating set" (RCDS), for any D ∈ V satisfying conditions 1) and 2) in Proposition 2.
Remark 3: By Remark 2 a connected dominating set is a RCDS, which is a dominating set according to condition 1) in Proposition 2. Hence, for a given graph it holds that domination number ≤ "relaxed connected domination number" ≤ connected domination number. Proposition 2 states that the perfect protection problem can be described as the RCDS problem seeking a minimum cardinality RCDS. In the sequel, we use the term RCDS problem exclusively to emphasize the graph nature of the problem and its connection to the connected dominating set problem. A proof similar to the one in [19] can establish that the RCDS problem is NP-hard even for planar graphs. This proof is obtained by reducing the RCDS problem from the planar vertex cover problem.
Proposition 3: The RCDS problem is NP-hard, even if the problem is restricted to instances with planar graphs.
IV. BRANCHWIDTH AND SPHERE-CUT DECOMPOSITION
If the given graph G = (V, E) is planar, the RCDS problem can be solved in time linear with problem instance size (i.e., |E|) when a graph structure parameter called branchwidth (to be defined shortly) is fixed. The proposed approach, which resembles but generalizes the ones in [15] , [16] , consists of two steps. Firstly, an optimal sphere-cut decomposition (to be defined) of G is computed. Secondly, a dynamic programming algorithm, based on the computed sphere-cut decomposition, solves the RCDS problem.
Given a graph (V, E), a branch decomposition [11] is a pair (T, τ) where T is a unrooted binary tree with |E| leaf nodes, and τ is a bijection from the set of leaf nodes of T to E. Every non-leaf node of T has degree three. For any e ∈ E(T ), the subgraph (V (T ), E(T ) \ {e}) has two connected components denoted T 1 (e) and T 2 (e). Let L 1 and L 2 denote the leaf nodes of T 1 (e) and T 2 (e), respectively. Then, we denote E 1 (e) := τ(L 1 ) ⊆ E and E 2 (e) := τ(L 2 ) ⊆ E. We define G 1 (e), G 2 (e) to be the subgraphs of G induced by E 1 (e) and E 2 (e) respectively. That is,
For e ∈ E(T ), we define the middle set, denoted ω(e), to be V (G 1 (e)) ∩ V (G 2 (e)). In other words, ω(e) := {v ∈ V v ∈ e 1 , v ∈ e 2 , for some e 1 ∈ E 1 (e) and e 2 ∈ E 2 (e)}. The width of branch decomposition (T, τ) is max e∈E(T ) |ω(e)|. The branchwidth of (V, E) is the minimum width over all branch decompositions of (V, E). A branch decomposition of (V, E) is optimal if its width is the branchwidth of the graph. For planar graphs, a sphere-cut decomposition is a branch decomposition with an additional property: for each e ∈ E(T ), it is possible to draw a closed curve separating the subgraphs G 1 (e) and G 2 (e) in an arbitrary planar embedding of G, such that the curve crosses G only at ω(e). Traversing the curve (clockwise or counterclockwise) leads to a cyclic order denoted by π e . For a planar graph (V, E), an optimal sphere-cut decomposition can be computed in O(log 2 (|V |)(|V | + |E|) 2 ) time (e.g., [20] ), as the optimal branch decomposition computed using [20] is also an optimal sphere-cut decomposition. two other edges incident to v e . Let e 1 and e 2 denote these two edges. They are the two children of e.
V. DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING FOR PLANAR RCDS PROBLEM

B. Dynamic programming procedure
For each e ∈ E(T ), we color the nodes in ω (e) in three possible basic colors: 0,0, 1. A vector c e ∈ {0,0, 1} |ω (e)| is called a basic coloring (of ω (e)). In addition, basic color 0 can be associated with four detailed colors: 0 [ , 0 ] , 0 * , 0 s . Similarly, basic color 1 can be associated with the detailed colors: 1 [ , 1 ] , 1 * , 1 s . There is no detailed color associated with basic color0.
A vectorc e ∈ C |ω (e)| is called a detailed coloring (of ω (e)).
The detailed coloringsc e for e ∈ E(T ), supplemented by the basic colorings c e , define the dynamic programming states which parameterize the partial problems denoted by P e (c e ). A partial problem P e (c e ) seeks a minimum cardinality set D ⊆ V (G e ) satisfying the "domination constraint" (details in Appendix A in [1] ) and the "relaxed connectedness constraint" (details in Appendix C in [1] ). It can be verified (details omitted) that the solution to P e (·) can be assembled from those of P e 1 (·) and P e 2 (·) with e 1 and e 2 being the two children of e. In addition, P {z,r} (·) is the original RCDS problem. We denote A e (c e ) as the optimal objective value of partial problem P e (c e ), with A e (c e ) = ∞ if and only if P e (c e ) is infeasible. A e (·) is the value function in dynamic programming. For e ∈ E(T ) incident to a leaf node in T , the partial problem P e (·) involves only one edge and two nodes -it can be solved by enumeration. Accordingly, for these "leaf edges" of T the value function A e (·) can be defined with the following rule depending on whether |ω are consistent with c e . In addition, Appendix C in [1] provides the details about whenc e 1 andc e 2 are compatible, whichc e is resulted and how A e (c e ) is updated. For edge {z, r} (i.e., the last iteration), ω ({z, r}) = / 0 and hence Algorithm 1 should be interpreted accordingly. In this case, the value function A {z,r} is in fact a constant, obtained by the minimization in the dynamic programming recursion in Appendix D in [1] . The details of the last iteration are explained in Appendices B and D in [1] .
Let D denote the minimum RCDS to be returned. Then the members of D can be decided by a tree traversal starting from the root: let e r 1 and e r 2 denote the two children edges of {z, r}. Letc * e r 1 ,c * e r 2 be a minimizing pair leading to the value of A {z,r} as returned by Algorithm 1. Subsequently, for each e ∈ E(T ) such thatc * e is known, we handle two cases: • If e is incident to a leaf node of T then for each u ∈ ω (e),c * e (u) ∈ {1 [ , 1 ] , 1 * , 1 s } implies u ∈ D and u / ∈ D otherwise. If |ω (e)| = 1 and suppose u ∈ ω (e) and v / ∈ ω (e), then v ∈ D if and only if u / ∈ D . • If e is not incident to a leaf node, then the optimal detailed coloringsc * e 1 andc * e 2 for the two children edges e 1 and e 2 are set asc e 1 (c * e ) andc e 2 (c * e ). The process continues until all edges in T have been visited.
C. Fixed parameter tractability
The computation effort of the entire dynamic programming procedure for planar RCDS problem is dominated by the dynamic programming recursion from leaves of T to root (i.e., Algorithm 1 in Section V-B). In the innermost for-loop, the computation cost is dominated by the checking of whetherc e 1 andc e 2 are compatible, which amounts to computing connected components of the bipartite graph detailed in Appendix C in [1] . This cost is O((|ω (e 1 )| + |(ω (e 2 )|) 2 ) = O(BW 2 ) time (e.g., [21] ), where BW is the branchwidth of graph G. From each basic coloring c e x (x being a wildcard for 1 or 2), at most 4 |ω (e x )| detailed colorings can be derived (e.g., c e x = (1, 1, . . . , 1) leads to 4 |ω (e x )| detailed colorings). Therefore, the innermost forloop is executed at most 4 |ω (e 1 )|+|ω (e 2 )| = O(4 2BW ) times, for each specific pair of basic colorings (c e 1 , c e 2 ). In total, there are no more than 3 (|ω (e)|+|ω (e 1 )|+|ω (e 2 )|) = O(3 3BW ) pairs of basic colorings (c e 1 , c e 2 ) considered in Algorithm 1. Therefore, Algorithm 1 requires O(BW 2 3 3BW 4 2BW ) time for each run. Since Algorithm 1 is run for each e ∈ E(T ) between the root and leaves of T and |E(T )| = O(|E|), the total computation cost for dynamic programming recursion is O(BW 2 3 3BW 4 2BW |E|). This is typical complexity result of a sphere-cut decomposition based algorithm. Computation cost grows very moderately with problem instance size, provided that branchwidth is small. The numerical study in Section VI indicates that small branchwidth is common in practice.
VI. NUMERICAL CASE STUDY
Graphs from the IEEE power system benchmarks are considered. The minimum RCDS of these graphs are computed by solving integer program (1). To evaluate the proposed sphere-cut decomposition/dynamic programming based solution approach (SCD approach for short) for planar graphs, we "planarize" the benchmark graphs using the algorithm in [14] if necessary. Then we compute the corresponding minimum RCDS using the SCD approach. The cardinality of the minimum RCDS on the planarized graph is an upper bound of the cardinality of the minimum RCDS on the original graph, because removing edges makes it more difficult both to satisfy condition 1) and condition 2) in Proposition 2. As a comparison, the minimum dominating sets of the benchmarks are computed to illustrate the difference between the RCDS problem and the dominating set problem. The computation results are listed in Table I . In the fifth column, the symbol BW p denotes the branchwidth of the planarized benchmark graph. In the sixth column, the symbol |D SCD | denotes the cardinality of the minimum RCDS of the planarized benchmark, as returned by the SCD method. This number is greater than or equal to the cardinality of the minimum RCDS of the original graph, which is denoted by |D | in the seventh column. In the last column, the symbol |DS| denotes the regular domination number. It is smaller than or equal to |D |, because a RCDS is a dominating set with an additional property (cf. Proposition 2). Table I verifies the fact that when a graph is planar, the SCD approach computes the exact minimum RCDS. In cases where planarization is necessary, the SCD approach computes only a suboptimal solution. IEEE 9  9  9  yes  2  3  3  3  IEEE 14  14  20  yes  2  4  4  4  IEEE 24  24  34  no  3  8  8  7  IEEE 30  30  41  yes  3  10  10  10  IEEE 39  39  46  yes  3  15  15  13  IEEE 57  57  78  no  4  20  19  17  IEEE 118  118 179  yes  4  34  34  32  IEEE 300  300 409  no  4  97  93  87 To compute the minimum RCDS, problem (1) is solved using IBM CPLEX. To compute the minimum dominating set, an integer program from [14] is solved using IBM CPLEX. To compute the branchwidth and sphere-cut decomposition, we utilize the state-of-the-art implementation by Prof. Gu's group [22] . The dynamic programming computations, as described in Section V-B, are implemented in MATLAB (for ease of implementation). The computations for branchwidth and branch decomposition are performed on a Linux machine with a 3 GHz CPU and 4GB of RAM. All other computations are performed on a Mac machine with a 2.5 GHz CPU and 8GB of RAM. The computation times for solving the RCDS problem using the SCD approach and integer programming (CPLEX) are shown in Table II . In the table, the column labeled T SCD represents the time to compute the spherecut decomposition (with the code from Gu's group). The column labeled T DP represents the time to run dynamic programming as described in Section V-B. The column labeled T IP represents the time to run CPLEX. From the table, it can be seen that the computation effort of the SCD approach (computing sphere-cut decomposition and dynamic programming) is affected significantly by the branchwidth of the graph, while the effort grows roughly linearly with the problem instance size (i.e., |E|). This is consistent with the computation time analyses in [22] and in Section V-C. However, while the MATLAB implementation of the dynamic programming has acceptable efficiency (within a minute for all test instances), it is far from efficient in contrast with the sphere-cut decomposition implementation and CPLEX. For dynamic programming, a more advanced implementation using a more appropriate language (e.g., C instead of MATLAB) is highly desirable. CPLEX runtime remains reasonable for all the test instances. In a future study, even larger instances should be tested to determine the limitation of integer programming approach.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper is the second installment (the first being [14] ) of the author's effort to introduce the machinery of graph decomposition (in particular, branch decomposition) to systematically exploit the inherent structure of power networks in practice, in order to develop solution strategies to solve hard combinatorial optimization problems relevant to applications. These two papers demonstrate the flexibility of graph decomposition/dynamic programming as a methodology to derive customized algorithms for application problems. The computation cost of the proposed methodology grows only linearly with problem instance size, provided that the branchwidth is fixed and small. This is drastically different from the scalability property of the integer programming approach. While the computation studies still indicate considerably better efficiency performance for CPLEX, the graph decomposition approach (with the author's amateur implementation) performs reasonably well in practice. The prospect of better scalability of the graph decomposition approach calls for algorithmic developments and implementations in more professional manners in order to truly demonstrate the power of the approach. Further, more theoretical development is desirable. For instance, removing the planarity assumption can dramatically broaden the scope of applications.
